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I. Introduction
In the last eighteen months, there have been some interest-
ing developments in State aid law both in terms of legisla-
tive changes and in terms of judgments being issued in
important cases of the General Court (GC) and the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Given the con-
straints imposed by a survey of this nature, we cannot cover
each of these developments in great detail. Therefore, from
a legislative perspective, our analysis is limited to a brief
overview of the reform of two Regulations which form part
of the Commission’s State aid modernisation programme.
The modernisation programme has three main objec-
tives, closely linked: (i) to foster growth in a strengthened
dynamic and competitive internal market; (ii) to focus en-
forcement on cases with the biggest impact on the internal
market; (iii) to streamline rules and enable faster decisions.
The European Commission wishes State aid control to
more effectively target sustainable growth-enhancing pol-
icies while at the same time encouraging budgetary con-
solidation, limiting distortions of competition and keeping
the single market open. Furthermore, although these
aspects are not covered in the present article, it is worth
keeping in mind that the Commission’s modernisation
proposals also include the revision, streamlining, and pos-
sibly the consolidation of State aid guidelines to make
them consistent with the common principles for assessing
the compatibility of aid with the internal market in the fol-
lowing fields:
† regional aid (new guidelines adopted in June 2013
and effective as from 2014);
† research & development and innovation (consultation
closed and issue papers under discussion with a view
to proposing new guidelines);
† environmental and energy aid (draft new guidelines
to be adopted in December 2013 or in early 2014);
† risk capital (draft new guidelines being discussed with
the Member States and to be adopted soon);
† broadband (new guidelines adopted in December 2012);
† aviation (consultation launched in July 2013; guide-
lines to be adopted in December 2003 or in early
2014); and
† rescue and restructuring aid (new draft guidelines
adopted on 5 November 2013, under consultation).
In addition, as part of its modernisation programme,
the Commission is also currently reviewing the General
Block Exemption Regulation and the de minimis regula-
tion (consultation on a second draft regulation in July
2013). It is also worth noting that the Commission will
clarify and better explain the notion of State aid in a new
‘State aid notice’. This will take the form of an interpret-
ative communication, which will give a synthetic and
pedagogical overview of the notion of State aid, as con-
strued by the case law, but as the Commission under-
stands it (as for other interpretative communications, the
Commission is not allowed to add anything to existing
law). The impact of this new notice, which is expected to
be published in draft at the end of 2013 or early 2014, is,
however, regarded as being very important in view of its
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Key Points
† In the field of State aid, the Commission has
launched a modernisation programme which
includes, among many other elements, the adop-
tion of amendments to the procedural regulation,
and a revision of the scope of the general block ex-
emption regulation.
† In various judgments, the European courts have
shed new light on elements essential to the defin-
ition of State aid—namely the concept of under-
taking, the notion of advantage, the private
creditor test, as well as the circumstances in which
State resources are included.
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effects on the Commission’s own decision-making prac-
tice, on economic and social actors and the scope of
their economic activity being caught by State aid law,
and on national judges.
Lastly when it comes to the case law of the European
Courts, our survey centres on a selection of cases, all of
which relate to the notion of State aid. In the flow of
decisions and court cases adopted during one year, it
has been decided to focus, following a quite subjective
selection and in view of the limited scope of the present
survey, on cases ruled by the General Court (GC) and
the CJEU, setting aside very interesting Commission
decisions and national courts judgments.
II. State aid modernisation
In this section, we focus on two legislative developments
that have taken place in the area of State aid law in the
past twelve months. In particular, we seek to provide an
overview of two important procedural amendments that
were adopted in July 2013. The first legislative change
was the adoption of a regulation amending Regulation
No 659/1999 (the procedural regulation), and the second
legislative amendment concerns the reform of Regulation
No 994/98 (the enabling regulation). These two regula-
tions were published on 31 July 2013 in the Official
Journal of the European Union and entered into force on
20 August 2013.
A. Reforming Regulation 659/1999
On 22 July 2013, the Council of the European Union
adopted a Regulation amending Regulation No 659/1999.
It aims to make the complaints procedure more effective,
gives wider investigative powers to the Commission and
introduces a framework for formal cooperation between
the Commission and national courts.
1. Complaints
The amended Procedural Regulation introduces some
additional requirements for the submission of a com-
plaint informing the Commission of any alleged unlaw-
ful aid or any alleged misuse of aid. The complaining
party will now have to demonstrate a legitimate interest
and complete a compulsory complaint form, which it is
hoped will help improve the efficiency and transparency
of the complaints procedure.
In certain circumstances, the Commission may decide
not to respond to complaints (which could be seen as a
legislative change to the current requirements under EU
case law).1 Prior to the adoption of the amending regula-
tion, the Commission was bound to diligently and im-
partially examine any complaint it received. Now, the
Commission may decide not to respond to a complaint
where the complaint does not comply with the compul-
sory complaint format or where the substance of the
complaint does not sufficiently ‘show, on the basis of a
prima facie examination, the existence of unlawful aid or
misuse of aid’. The complainant must nonetheless be
informed of the Commission’s decision not to respond
and be given a prescribed period in which to submit
further comments. If the complainant does not submit
further comments within this time, the complaint is
deemed to have been withdrawn.
It is true that the Commission has limited resources.
It is also true that, each year, hundreds of complaints (ap-
parently 30 per cent) are completely unfounded or ‘friv-
olous’. Nevertheless, one cannot help (and this is not new)
but feel that complainants are not always treated as fairly
as they should be in competition law (which would, at
least, require a ‘prima facie right of review’). If not duly
handled by the Commission, the only option left to com-
plainants is to bring the matter before the courts, in
limited circumstances (ie not where the complaint is
clearly unfounded), and argue that a Council Regulation
may not ignore the application of certain general princi-
ples of European law.
2. Request for information from third parties
The Procedural Regulation fails to provide specific rights
protecting the interests of third parties vis-a`-vis the rele-
vant Member State. The formal procedure remains
limited (as provided by the Treaty) to a bilateral discus-
sion between the Member State and the Commission.
However, the Commission has now been given the
power to require interested third parties (being any
Member State other than the notifying or interested
Member State and any concerned market player, such as
an undertaking or an association of undertakings) to
provide ‘all market information necessary for completing
its assessment, if the information provided by the Member
State concerned during the course of the preliminary inves-
tigation is not sufficient, taking due account of the principle
of proportionality, in particular for small and medium-
sized enterprises’.
In addition, the Commission has also been given the
power to impose fines and penalties when undertakings
or associations of undertakings ‘intentionally or through
gross negligence’ supply ‘incorrect or misleading informa-
tion’ in response to a request for information from the
1 See Athinaı¨ki Techniki case in Concurrences No 4–2008, pp. 112–116, obs.
J-Y Che´rot and J. Derenne.
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Commission or supply ‘incorrect, incomplete or misleading
information’ in response to a decision of the Commission.
Where these conditions are met, the Commission may,
when it deems it to be necessary and proportionate,
impose fines of up to 1 per cent of total turnover in the
preceding financial year (it is worth noting that this new
power to impose fines and penalties has created a third
area of unlimited jurisdiction for the GC and the CJEU—
after Regulation No 1/2003 and the Computer Reserva-
tion Systems Regulation).
In some ways, these new sanctions align the rules of pro-
cedure for State aid with the relevant legislation relating to
anticompetitive practices. This is only true, however, with
regard to the treatment of undertakings and associations of
undertakings, being interested third parties in a procedure,
which is only between the relevant Member State and the
Commission. It must also be pointed out that a Member
State which does not provide the information requested
within the prescribed time limit, or which provides incom-
plete information, will receive only ‘a reminder’ from the
Commission. This preferential treatment makes State aid
decidedly different from other areas of competition law.
The Commission’s new powers are tightly controlled
(again in order to protect the interests of the relevant
Member States): the Commission may only request in-
formation once they have opened a formal investigation
procedure, which they have identified as being ineffect-
ive, relating to the beneficiaries of the aid in question.
The Commission must also obtain the prior agreement
of the Member State concerned (which may considerably
limit the effective powers of the Commission: in other
words, the main source of the inefficiency of the proced-
ure—by lack of response or accurate responses, quite often
deliberately—will have to agree on the decision to exercise
powers ensuring the efficacy of the investigation!). However,
an undertakings’ legitimate interest to protect their business
secrets and other confidential information is protected as is
the right to anonymity (in relation to the Member State
concerned) of a non-beneficiary undertaking.
The Commission may now open investigations by eco-
nomic sector or aid instrument.
Member States will probably attempt to use all of their
influence to prevent the introduction of the amended
Procedural Regulation from resulting in the implementa-
tion of more effective State aid proceedings against them.
3. Cooperation between the Commission and the
national courts
A new chapter, entitled ‘cooperation with national courts’
has been added to the Procedural Regulation. National
courts will now have the power to make a formal request
(as opposed to an informal communication with the
Commission, which has not tended to be very successful)
asking the Commission to ‘transmit to them information
in its possession or its opinion on questions concerning the
application of State aid rules’. In return, the Commission
may, acting of its own accord, submit written observa-
tions to the courts of the Member States, where the coher-
ent application of Article 107(1) or Article 108(3) of the
TFEU so requires. The Commission may also ask the rele-
vant court of the Member State to provide them with
documents at their disposal, where such documents are
required for the Commission’s assessment of the matter.
However, the Commission will only be able to intervene
in a case being heard before a national court when they
have been authorised to do so by that national court.
The formal introduction of these new rules has created
a set of principles of cooperation analogous to the princi-
ples of anticompetitive practices defined in Article 15 of
Regulation No 1/2003. They should permit the Commis-
sion to play a more prominent and effective role in ensur-
ing that the rules on State aid are properly applied by
national courts. Parties coming before these courts will
have a vital role to play in notifying the Commission of
any cases that justify its intervention.
This may be, when also taking into account the Com-
mission’s new investigation powers, the most significant
change to the rules of procedure for State aid in nearly
fifty years (since Costa v ENEL).
B. Reforming Regulation (EC) No 994/98
As part of the Commission’s State Aid Modernisation
Initiative, the Council of the European Union has amended
Regulation (EC) No 994/98 in order to introduce new cat-
egories of aid for which block exemptions may be made.
To this end, the Council has included a number of
new categories of aid in the Enabling Regulation for
which the Commission may adopt Regulations, includ-
ing: research and development, culture, natural disasters,
sport, certain aspects of agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
As the Commission’s decision-making practice has
shown, these categories of aid will often have a limited
effect on the exchanges between Member States and result
in only insignificant distortions of competition. This, in
itself, justifies the introduction of a block exemption.
The consultation on the draft amendment to the
General Block Exemption Regulation, which applies this
new Enabling Regulation, was completed in September
2013.
III. European Court cases, 2012–2013
This section provides a selective, and brief, overview of
some of the State aid cases on which the European
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Courts have ruled since the end of 2012 (until early No-
vember 2013, at the time of writing the present article).
As will become apparent, a large number of the judg-
ments covered here focus on the application of the con-
ditions of Article 107(1) TFEU (notion of aid). In this
respect, the judgments cover the following issues:
† the concept of an undertaking;
† the concept of advantage;
† the private creditor test;
† the concept of State resources; and
† the conditions of affectation of inter-State trade and
distortion of competition.
The Courts in these judgments, however, do not intro-
duce any significant changes but rather they limit them-
selves to reiterating prior case law and applying it to
particular facts of each case, although thereby creating
certain nuances and new areas of legal development. It is
true that EU case law mainly responds to the endless cre-
ativity of the Member States in State aid matters, which
tends to expose the notion of State aid to various levels of
strain (sometimes leading to a restriction of the notion
and sometimes leading to an extension of the notion).
A. ‘Undertakings’ for the purposes of Article
107(1) TFEU
1. Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig
Halle v Commission
On 19 December 2012, the CJEU handed down its judg-
ment in the appeals by Mitteldeutsche Flughafen (MF)
and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle (FLH) against a General
Court judgment relating to a European Commission de-
cision that a grant of E350 million by Germany to FLH
in the form of capital contributions for the purpose of
funding investments in the construction of a new south-
ern runway constituted compatible State aid.2 The
General Court held that the construction of airport in-
frastructure is part of the economic activity of operating
an airport and that public funding of infrastructure
which is necessary for the operation of the airport allevi-
ates the costs that the airport operator would normally
have to bear and, therefore, constitutes State aid. The
parties argued that the General Court had infringed
Article 107(1) of the TFEU and the principles of non-
retroactivity, legitimate expectations, and legal certainty,
but the CJEU dismissed the appeal in its entirety.
The central argument of the parties had been that the
construction or extension of airport infrastructure did
not constitute an economic activity governed by EU
State aid law, so that the financing of it could not be held
to constitute State aid. They relied heavily on a 1994
Commission Communication which stated that ‘the con-
struction or enlargement of infrastructure projects (such as
airports, motorways, bridges, etc.) represents a general
measure of economic policy which cannot be controlled by
the Commission under the Treaty rules on State aid.’3
The CJEU noted that the General Court had consid-
ered the Commission’s appreciation of the Ae´roports de
Paris case (Case T-238/98), which recognised that, as of
2000, an airport operator is in principle to be regarded
as engaging in an economic activity within the meaning
of Article 107(1) of the TFEU. For the purposes of estab-
lishing whether the construction of the new southern
railway could be characterised as an economic activity,
the General Court had made an assessment of that activ-
ity and examined its nature in accordance with the case
law. In doing so, the General Court found that the con-
struction of the runway could not be dissociated from
the operation by FLH of airport infrastructure, which
constitutes an economic activity.4
The CJEU confirmed the Commission’s broad inter-
pretation of the notion of State aid within the meaning
of Article 107(1) TFEU. An economic activity is present
if an enterprise engages in economic activity—offering
goods or services in a market—for commercial purposes.
At point 50, it noted that: ‘It is settled case law that, first,
in the field of competition law the concept of undertaking
covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless
of the legal status and the way in which it is financed and,
secondly, any activity consisting in offering goods or services
on a given market is an economic activity. It follows from
this that whether or not an activity is economic in nature
does not depend on the private or public status of the entity
engaged in it or the profitability of that activity.’5
Although this judgment concerns the airport sector, it
is likely that the principles established in it will apply to
the public financing of other kinds of infrastructure in
the future, and that a large part of public financing of in-
frastructure will be regarded as State aid. As a conse-
quence, we can expect numerous State aid notifications
concerning public infrastructure projects in the future.
This judgment largely reinforces the Commission’s pos-
ition vis-a`-vis the Member States with respect to these
infrastructure projects.
2 CJEU: Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-
Halle GmbH v Commission, not yet reported.
3 Ibid., paras 23–34.
4 Ibid., para. 44.
5 Ibid., para. 50.
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2. Germany v Commission: nature conservation
organisations
In this case, the measures at issue involved the gratuitous
transferal of federally-owned natural heritage sites to
the Lander and the Deutsche Bundesstiffung Umwelt
(German Environment Foundation), and the funding of
large-scale nature conservation projects.6 Furthermore,
the Lander could in turn also transfer these areas gratuit-
ously to nature conservation organisations. The recipi-
ents of these natural heritage sites would bear the
burden of having to ensure that they are able to preserve
these sites. Moreover and subject to certain restrictions,
the German scheme allowed the conservation entities to
draw revenues from the land they managed through ac-
tivities such as hunting leases, fishing leases, sales of
wood obtained from forestry upkeep activities and
tourism. The revenues generated would be offset against
the costs of the nature conservation projects and if there
were excess in revenues, these would be repaid to the in-
stitution which awarded the grant to the conservation
entity in the first place.
The key issue that the General Court had to rule on
was to determine whether the conservation entities
constituted ‘undertakings’ for the purposes of Article
107(1) TFEU or put simply whether they performed
‘economic activities’ which consisted in offering goods
or services in a given market. Given the public policy
objective that these entities pursue, the debate was
focused on whether the ability to perform revenue-gen-
erating activities was sufficient for them to be consid-
ered as undertakings.
The Court found that even though these secondary
activities resulted from these entities’ primary activity
of protecting the environment, they were not rendered
obligatory by the latter. Thus, by offering these goods
or services in markets open to competition, these
nature conservation entities are pursuing an objective
that can be dissociated from the social policy objective
of protecting the environment.7 Therefore, in line with
prior case law, the General Court found that these entities
did constitute undertakings for the purposes of competi-
tion law.8 Lastly, since the secondary activities involved
participation in the market that was capable of undermin-
ing the objectives of competition law, the General Court
explained that it was irrelevant that the revenues gener-
ated had to be employed to finance the conservation
tasks.9
B. The advantage
1. France v Commission: implied unlimited
State guarantee
On 20 September 2012, the General Court issued a judg-
ment confirming the Commission’s decision finding that
France had granted aid to La Poste. The Commission
had found that France had granted incompatible State
aid to La Poste in the form of an implied unlimited State
guarantee.10 Given its legal status, La Poste was not
subject to the ordinary law rules on administration and
winding up and, as a result, the Commission had found
that creditors of La Poste were in a more favourable situ-
ation than private creditors. Contrary to what occurred
under the application of ordinary law rules governing
compulsory administration or winding-up, the creditor
of a publicly owned establishment such as La Poste did
not run the risk of seeing his claim cancelled because of
a judicial winding-up procedure being triggered.
The General Court endorsed the Commission’s position
and in line with previous case law, found that an unlimited
State guarantee allows the recipient of such a guarantee to
benefit from credit terms that are more favourable than the
terms it would have obtained on its merits alone and
therefore eases the pressure on its budget. Therefore, un-
surprisingly, the implied unlimited State guarantee from
which La Poste had benefitted granted it an advantage
over its competitors.11
2. Poste Italiane SpA v Commission
On 13 September 2013, the General Court handed down
its judgment on an action for annulment by Poste Ita-
liane SpA against a decision of the European Commis-
sion which found that aid (in the form of high interest
rates) paid to Poste Italiane was incompatible and
should be recovered.12 The Commission had found that
Poste Italiane’s banking activities had received an eco-
nomic advantage. Under an Italian Treasury scheme
(dating from 1945), Poste Italiane was legally required to
deposit funds collected from its current accounts with
the Treasury. The Treasury paid interest on those depos-
its by virtue of a methodology established under Italian
budgetary law (under a convention dated 2006), which
the Commission considered to be at a higher rate than a
private borrower would have been prepared to pay.
The General Court held that the Commission should
not have relied solely on a comparison between the
6 GC: Case T-347/09 Germany v Commission, not yet reported.
7 Ibid., para. 41.
8 Ibid., para. 43.
9 Ibid., para. 50.
10 GC: Case T-154/10 France v Commission, not yet reported.
11 Ibid., paras 106–108.
12 GC: Case T-525/08 Poste Italiane SpA v Commission, not yet reported.
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Treasury rates and the private borrower rates but should
have looked at the overall effect of the State intervention,
particularly the fact that Poste Italiane was legally obliged
to place the funds with the Treasury.
The General Court also found that the Commission
had erred in its assessment of the alternative investment
strategies that would have been available to Poste Italiane
in the absence of that legal obligation. In one case the
Commission had erroneously deducted management
fees. The Commission had also used too short a period
(three years) to assess the profitability of the alternative
investment management strategy, and wrongly concluded
that capital gains or capital losses could not be considered
in an ex ante analysis of the total returns available.
In light of the above, the CJEU held that the Commis-
sion had not established to the requisite legal standard
that Poste Italiane received an economic advantage such
that the measure constituted State aid. The General
Court, therefore, annulled the Commission’s decision.
This case shows the importance of the overall approach
in examining State measures under State aid law.
C. The private investor principle
1. Commission v Buczek Automotive
On 21 March 2013, the CJEU rejected an appeal by the
European Commission against a General Court judgment
that annulled a Commission decision requiring recovery
of State aid granted to the Polish steel producer Technolo-
gie Buczek Group.13 The CJEU concluded that the
General Court had not made any error of law in finding
that the Commission had not provided sufficient reasons
or analysis to support its conclusion that the Polish au-
thorities had not acted like a private creditor in the way in
which it sought to recover public debts from the company.
The Polish authorities in this case had chosen not to start
bankruptcy proceedings against the group, but had chosen
instead legal proceedings for the recovery of debt.
The CJEU considered that the Commission could not
have concluded that the potential recovery under a re-
structuring would not have exceeded that obtained by
liquidation of the company without a comparison of the
duration of bankruptcy proceedings against the legal
procedure for the recovery of debts.14
2. Frucona Kosice v Commission
On 24 January 2013, the CJEU set aside the General
Court’s judgment upholding a Commission decision
finding that the Slovakian tax office had granted incom-
patible State aid to Frucona (a producer of spirit and
spirit-based beverages in Slovakia) in the form a write-off
of a tax debt.15
Under Slovak Law No 328/1991, there are two proce-
dures, which are supervised by the courts for companies
that find themselves in a position of indebtedness. Whilst
the bankruptcy procedure has the result that the indebted
company ceases to the exist, under the arrangement pro-
cedure, the indebted company is allowed to pursue its ac-
tivities, leading to an agreement under which the indebted
company repays a portion of its debt in return for the
balance being written off. In this case, Frucona, who had
benefitted in the past from several deferrals for the payment
of its tax debt, opted for the arrangement procedure with
the acceptance of all of its creditors including the local tax
office. The arrangement involved paying each creditor 35
per cent of the amount owed to each of them.
The central issue that the CJEU faced in this instance
was to determine whether the General Court had failed
to correctly apply the private creditor test by not estab-
lishing whether the Commission had actually taken into
account the duration of the bankruptcy procedure in its
assessment of the test. After briefly recalling the basic
principles developed by case law on the private creditor
test, the CJEU stated that all information that is liable to
have a significant influence on the decision-making
process of a normally prudent and diligent private credit-
or, in a situation as close as possible to that of the public
creditor seeking to recover sums due to it by a debtor ex-
periencing difficulty in making the payments, must be
regarded as relevant.16 Lastly, the Court considered that
the duration of the procedure was a factor that could have
a significant influence and that the General Court had
failed to establish whether the Commission had taken into
account the duration of the bankruptcy procedure in its
assessment of the private creditor test.17
3. Nitrogenmuvek Vegyipari v Commission
On 27 February 2013, the General Court issued a ruling
dismissing an action of annulment brought against a Com-
mission decision finding that the grant of two loans by the
Hungarian development bank, which had been guaranteed
by the Hungarian State, constituted unlawful and partially
incompatible aid, which had to be recovered.18
The General Court found that the Commission had
correctly applied the private investor principle since it
had checked whether the beneficiary of the loans would
13 CJEU: Case C-405/11 P Commission v Buczek Automotive, not yet reported.
14 Ibid., paras 54–64.
15 CJEU: Case C-73/11 P Frucona Kosice v Commission, not yet reported.
16 Ibid., para. 78.
17 Ibid., paras 81–88.
18 GC: Case T-387/11 Nitrogenmuvek Vegyipari v Commission, not yet
reported.
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have been able to secure the same loans on the capital
market.19 Moreover, it is also worth noting that the General
Court found that the fact that the collateral had a value
which was over 70 per cent of the loans did not imply that
the beneficiary would have obtained loans at comparable
rates to those granted by the Hungarian Development
Bank.20
In addition, it is also worth underlining the General
Court’s rejection of the applicant’s argument that the
Commission had committed a manifest error in rejecting
the ‘BB’ rating that had been attributed to the beneficiary
by the Hungarian Development bank and replacing it by
its own ‘CCC’ rating. The General Court pointed out that
in line with the reference rate communication, the Com-
mission does not have to accept a rating attributed by the
national bank. This is even more relevant when the State
authorities refuse to provide the necessary information
that would enable the Commission to check the attribu-
ted rating.21
D. State resources
1. French Fruit and Vegetables
On 27 September 2012, the General Court dismissed three
challenges of a Commission decision that found that
French ‘contingency plans’ for the fruit and vegetable
sector constituted unlawful and incompatible State aid.22
The General Court found that the Commission had been
correct to find that the measures at issue constituted State
aid even though they were co-financed by voluntary contri-
butions from farmers’ associations. The relevant criterion
for determining whether an aid measure is funded through
State resources is not the initial origin of the resources but
the degree of intervention by the public authority in the
definition of the measure and its method of financing.23
The General Court found that the use of State resources
derived from the following elements:
† Oniflhor, a public institution under the supervision
of the French State, decided unilaterally on the sums
allocated and the amount of contributions;
† the measures were determined by Oniflhor’s decisions;
† the Ministry of Agriculture had a far reaching and
regular power of audit;
† the State played a predominant role in the farmers’ asso-
ciations (in particular, with respect to the amendment
of rules and designation of representatives).
2. Bouygues and Bouygues Telecom v Commission
(France Telecom case)
On 19 March 2013, following cross appeals by Bouygues
and the Commission, the CJEU set aside the judgment
of the General Court annulling a Commission decision
finding that France had granted France Telecom unlaw-
ful and incompatible State aid via the combination of
public statements of support by the Minister for eco-
nomic affairs and the offer of a shareholder loan, which
was not taken up by France Telecom.24
The CJEU held that the General Court erred in law,
both in its review of the Commission’s identification of
the State intervention measure conferring State aid and
in the examination of the links between the advantage
identified and the commitment of State resources
found by the Commission. The General Court wrongly
required a close connection between the advantage and
the commitment of State resources. When determining
the existence of State aid, the Commission must estab-
lish a sufficiently direct link between the advantage given
to the beneficiary and a reduction of the State budget or
a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on that
budget.25 However, contrary to what the General Court
found, it is not necessary that such a reduction, or even
such a risk, should correspond or be equivalent to that
advantage, or that the advantage should have as its coun-
terpoint such a reduction or such a risk, or be of the
same nature as the commitment of State resources from
which it derives.26
The CJEU went on to give final judgment on the
issues that were considered by the General Court,
ruling that the Commission had rightly found that, in
this case, an advantage was granted through State
resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the
TFEU. Whilst it was true that France Telecom did not
sign the loan agreement sent to it, the company could
have signed it at any time and acquired the right to
obtain immediate payment of E9 billion. The CJEU
considered that the mere potential of the arrangements
was enough.27
The CJEU referred the actions for annulment back to
the General Court for judgment on the pleas raised
before it by France and France Telecom on which it did
not give a ruling.28
This judgment provides important clarification of when
a public statement of support can qualify as State aid.
19 Ibid., para. 16–23.
20 Ibid., paras 35–38.
21 Ibid., paras 40–43.
22 GC: Case T- 139/09 France v Commission, not yet reported.
23 Ibid., para. 63.
24 CJEU: Joined Cases C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues
Telecom v Commission, not yet reported.
25 Ibid., para. 109.
26 Ibid., para. 110.
27 Ibid., paras 137–139.
28 Ibid., para. 142.
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3. Doux Elevage SNC et Coope´rative agricole UKL-ARREE
v Ministe`re de l’Agriculture et CIDEF
In this case,29 the competent national court raised a ques-
tion for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpret-
ation of Article 107(1) TFEU. More specifically, the
question which needed answering in this instance was
whether a decision by which a national authority extends
to all traders in an agricultural industry an inter-trade
agreement which introduces the levying of a compulsory
contribution, for the purposes of financing common
activities decided by the organisation, constitutes State aid.
In line with previous case law, the Court found that
there was no direct or indirect transfer of State resources
because: (i) the sums provided by the payment of these
contributions did not go through the State budget
or through another public body; and (ii) the State
relinquished any resources, in whatever form, which
under national legislation, should have been paid into
the State budget. The contributions, thus, remain
private in nature throughout their lifecycle and, in
order to collect those contributions in the event of non-
payment, the inter-trade organisation must follow the
normal civil or commercial judicial process, having no
State prerogatives.30
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that national au-
thorities cannot actually use the resources resulting from
the contributions to support certain undertakings, since
it is the inter-trade organisation that decides how to use
those resources, which are entirely dedicated to pursuing
objectives determined by the organisation. Thus, these
resources are not constantly under public control and
are not available to State authorities.31
Lastly, the Court explained that the fact that the inter-
trade organisations are partly financed by the State and
the fact that there is no separation in the accounts
between private and public funds did not alter the conclu-
sion that the element of ‘State resources’ has not been sat-
isfied. Thus, private funds do not become State resources
simply because they are used alongside sums which may
originate from the State.32
4. Aiscat v European Commission
In Aiscat v European Commission, the General Court
upheld the Commission’s decision dismissing the com-
plaint made by the Italian association of concessionaires
for the construction and operation of highways and road
tunnels, Aiscat.33
Aiscat had complained that the Italian authorities had
granted State aid to the concessionaire CAV SpA which
was owned by the Region of Veneto and la Azienda
nazionale autonoma delle strade SpA(ANAS) which
forms part of the Italian State. CAV SpA had been
awarded the contract for the management and upkeep of
a fragment of highway called La Passante. The competent
public body adopted an administrative resolution which
increased the toll to be paid for the use of a highway
called La Tagenziale that was in direct competition with
La Passante. This increase was then incorporated in the
concession contracts signed between the concessionaires
and ANAS. In particular, in the contract signed between
ANAS and CAV SpA, CAV SpA undertook to reimburse
ANAS for having financed the construction of La Pas-
sante. In exchange, CAV SpA would obtain among other
sources of revenue: the product of the toll increase to be
applied in the Tagenziale. The increase ensured that the
toll would be the same for both highways despite the fact
that La Passante covered a longer distance and according
to Aiscat, since the product of the increase was used to
finance the construction of La Passante, CAV had bene-
fited from State aid.
Again, in line with previous case law, the General
Court found that there was no transfer of State resources
in this instance since no public body acquired any form
of control or possession over the sums of money. The
sums which were a product of the toll increase were paid dir-
ectly to CAV, either through the concessionaires that manage
the toll stations or via telepass. In other words, the transfer of
resources took place between private undertakings, with
no public body ever acquiring any form of control over
the sums.34
E. Effect on inter-state trade and distortion
of competition
1. Italy v Commission (Wam)
When it comes to the conditions of affecting inter-state
trade and distorting competition, the only judgment
worth reporting on is the General Court’s judgment in
Italy v Commission.35
In this case, the controversial measures involved two
loans that had been granted by Italy to Wam Industriale
Spa (a company active in the production and distribu-
tion of industrial mixers) for the purposes of penetrating
markets in third countries. These measures had already
29 CJEU: Case C-677/11 Doux Elevage SNC et Coope´rative agricole UKL-
ARREE v Ministe`re de l’Agriculture et CIDEF, not yet reported.
30 Ibid., para. 32.
31 Ibid., para. 36.
32 Ibid., paras 42–44.
33 GC: Case T-182/10 Aiscat v Commission, not yet reported.
34 Ibid., paras 103–106.
35 GC: Case T-257/10 Italy v Commission, not yet reported.
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been scrutinised by the European Commission in 2004
which adopted a decision finding that Italy had granted
unlawful and incompatible aid, and ordering the Italian
State to recover the aid declared incompatible with the
internal market. The decision was challenged and subse-
quently overturned by the General Court due to the
Commission’s failure to sufficiently motivate the applica-
tion of the conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU to the mea-
sures in question. After the General Court’s judgment36
was confirmed by the CJEU,37 the Commission adopted a
new decision declaring that the Italian State had granted
unlawful and incompatible aid and ordering the recovery
of that part of the aid that was incompatible.
In the present judgment, the General Court, after
carefully analysing the Commission’s reasons as to why
the loans in question were liable to affect inter-state
trade and to distort competition within the Union, con-
cluded that the Commission had not failed to comply
with its duty to state reasons.
The General Court recalled the case law according to
which, when State aid reinforces an undertaking com-
pared with other undertakings competing in intra-EU
trade, the latter must be regarded as influenced by that
aid. Furthermore, regarding the condition of the distor-
tion of competition, the General Court recalled that aid
that is intended to release an undertaking from costs
which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day
management or normal activities, in principle, distorts
the conditions of competition.38 In this respect, the
Court observed how the Commission had shown in its
reasoning that the beneficiary was present both in Euro-
pean and international markets, that it held a significant
part of those markets, and that it was in actual or poten-
tial competition with other undertakings in those
markets. Thus, as a result of the loans, Wam had seen its
position reinforced vis-a`-vis other actual or potential
competitors of other Member States.39
In addition, the conditions of competition would be
altered because, unlike its actual or potential competi-
tors, Wam did not need to finance its own programme
to penetrate markets in third countries. Moreover, the
loans permitted Wam to economise its resources and as
a result would allow Wam to either increase its profits or
sell its products at an inferior price in these third coun-
tries. Furthermore, the profits that are generated by
these exporting activities could then be used by Wam to
invest in the Union.40
In line with previous case law, the General Court
explained that, contrary to Italy’s assertions, in order to
show that the two conditions are met, the Commission
is not required to define the market in question and
analyse its structure as well as the competitive relation-
ships that arise. Lastly, the Court recalls that it is settled
case law that since these two conditions are linked, the
Commission is not required to analyse them separately
provided that the Commission’s reasoning clearly shows
how these conditions have been fulfilled.41
doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpt072
36 GC: Joined Cases T-304/04 and T-316/04 Italy & Wam SpA v Commission
ECR [2006] II-00064.
37 CJEU: Case C-494/06 P Commission v Italy and Wam SpA ECR [2009]
I-03639.
38 See note 35, paras 78–79.
39 Ibid., para. 83.
40 Ibid., para. 84.
41 Ibid., para. 100.
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